

tronic products, the burgeoning trade deficit in radio and television sets in 1966 represented a net loss of 13,000 jobs in the United States. Each imported set represented a loss of employment in component production also, so the total job loss resulting from our foreign trade in consumer electronic products and components was much greater than the 13,000 jobs. In fact, in these two industries there occurred an absolute loss of 60,000 jobs between December 1966 and December 1968. Regarding footwear, in the first half of 1969 seven New England shoe factories closed, with imports an important factor in each case. Total imports of foreign leather shoes entering the United States in 1969 totaled 36 percent more than in 1967. Since 1960 shoe imports have increased by 600 percent; imports equalled almost 28 percent of total domestic production in 1968. These increases represent jobs lost in our domestic industry, both in the manufacturing plants and in the tanneries in West Virginia, which supply the leather. The decreased use of leather hides as between 1968 and 1967 resulted in a loss of employment equal to 38 weeks of lost production in one tannery alone in my State.

In cellulosic manmade fiber production, one of the more technologically advanced industries in our State and in the Nation, our foreign trade deficit in 1966 was the equivalent of 600 jobs lost.

So, in sum, our six West Virginia industries lost more than 50,000 jobs nationally due to adverse foreign trade balances in 1966—and the number has grown since then. This is nearly twice our total employment in West Virginia in these industries.

States like West Virginia need industries to provide jobs for their people. We cannot afford to have these job-creating centers of activity damaged or driven out of the State by sheer neglect on the part of the National Government to lay down some reasonable ground rules as to the rate at which foreign goods will be allowed to take over our markets. We badly need solutions to these problems. The bill being introduced today will give the President the bargaining tools he needs to cope with these problems. More importantly, it will serve notice on our trading partners that we owe as much to our own people as we do to theirs, and that we are not going to hand over our markets to foreign goods and foreign jobs. We intend to keep a fair share for our own people.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3022), to provide for the orderly expansion of trade in manufactured products, introduced by Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (for Mr. RANDOLPH) (for himself and Mr. BYRD of West Virginia), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

S. 3023, S. 3204 AND SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 160—INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION ON DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION REVIEW

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, in the first 9 years of this decade, \$500 billion went into the military expenditures of this country, while the problems of poverty, hunger, and urban unrest intensified.

During this past year, however, several Members of the Senate made it clear that the special privileged position of the military and its industrial allies would no longer be ignored. Throughout several weeks of the summer, Members of the Senate carefully examined a \$21 billion military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1970 and battled over money for an anti-ballistic-missile system, super tanks, super airplanes, and more aircraft carriers.

Although the dissenting Senators came close to cutting large chunks of money from the budget, numerous fights ended unsuccessfully. The victory, however, was that the established tradition of rushing multi-billion dollar military bills through Congress was broken.

An examination of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shows that, over the previous 9 fiscal years of this decade, the House of Representatives never spent more than 1 day each year discussing military construction authorization proposals. The longest period of time ever spent on military procurement authorization in the House was 3 days for fiscal 1968. In the Senate, the record was not much better. Military construction debate was generally 1 or 2 days each year until fiscal 1969, when 6 days were spent. On military procurement, the Senate spent its longest debate—8 days—in fiscal 1968. Generally the floor debate was never more than 2 days.

It must be made clear, however, that, when the statistics were compiled, it was counted as a day, even if the discussion of the military procurement or construction bill was brought to the floor for a vote or if it was just briefly discussed.

Clearly, the statistics show a shocking indifference on the part of Congress. With the increased development of highly sophisticated, complicated weapons systems, Congress and the public have been willing to accept the judgments of the military with insufficient review. In our highly specialized society, it was just naturally assumed that the expert knew what is best. This unquestioning reliance on the military to determine policy that was clearly the responsibility of the Congress has been unwise. While the Senate committees responsible for military and foreign affairs have tried their best to keep up with the overwhelming amount of work directed at them, the pressures have been enormous. I believe that an

information source outside and independent of the military would be valuable to the committees and the Congress as a whole.

Instead, Congress has been faced with the massive military establishment. This country now has military installations around the world, including 429 major and 2,972 minor overseas military bases operated by more than a million men. The sprawling military bureaucracy controls millions of acres and expends more money annually than any other single organization on earth.

In facing the massive defense structure, Congress faces the country's largest employer—one out of every nine jobs is in the defense area. There are some 1.3 million civilian defense workers and 22,000 prime contractors and 100,000 subcontractors who are regularly involved in defense production. Defense Department awards in fiscal 1968 accounted for 81.4 percent of all contracts let by the Federal Government.

The soaring defense expenditures have risen from \$13 billion in 1950 to \$43 billion in 1960 and to more than \$80 billion this year. And even if the war is ended, the administration has already announced the dark news that there will be no peace dividend and that the \$30-odd billions spent annually for the war in Vietnam will not be transferred to the tightly squeezed domestic programs, but will be eaten up by the growing military demands.

The growing rate of runaway military spending was described in a recent issue of Fortune magazine in a discussion of the military-industrial complex, when one writer observed that, "under the pressures of the Vietnam war, civilian control over military spending has diminished, efficiency has decreased, and a large amount of 'gold plating' of the forces has taken place under the guise of meeting the needs of war. Unless brought under control, these trends can easily drive the defense budget to more than \$100 billion within a few years."

In his recent book, entitled "The Economy of Death," Richard Barnett made an even more depressing observation when he wrote:

Unless some crucial assumptions behind present defense policy are explicitly rejected, the Pentagon's escalator will soon take the American public on a ride toward a \$200 billion annual budget. Senator Stuart Symington, veteran member of the Armed Services Committee and former Secretary of the Air Force, points out that even a serious try at building a "thick" anti-ballistic missile system would cost about \$400 billion. In five years a \$200 billion defense budget is likely to sound an austere as \$80 billion does today. As for those who wish to return to the \$50 billion Eisenhower budget, the staggering size of which prompted the retiring President to utter his famous warning against the "military-industrial complex," such would-be budget-cutters are viewed in the Pentagon as proponents of unilateral disarmament.

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The obvious question is, What then happens to the vital domestic needs of the Nation? Today, of every 100 tax dollars paid to the Federal Government, approximately \$4 is spent for education; \$1.85 for community housing and development; \$1.25 for the preservation and utilization of our natural resources; \$8.60 for health—including \$6.70 for Medicare and Medicaid; \$6 for commerce and transportation; \$3.50 for agriculture; \$2.60 for space; \$2.50 for all programs of international assistance; and \$1 for all other social services. The rest of the money—approximately \$66—goes to pay for past wars, present conflicts, and future military preparedness.

What emerges is a picture of a nation whose economic welfare and gross national product are tied to warfare.

Several years ago, before Vietnam was a household word, Fred J. Cook in his book entitled "the Warfare State" aptly observed that there had been a civilian abdication of responsibility to the military and that "the legislature constantly defers to the military as the only source of supreme knowledge in the infinitely complicated world of modern arms."

If Congress is going to take its responsibility for reviewing military expenditures and challenge the alarming trend of a runaway military establishment, it must have its own authoritative, objective sources of information. It is no longer acceptable for the Pentagon, with its parochial view of the world, to set the definition, design the objectives, and establish the national priorities, while the Congress nods its trusting approval.

Any challenge to the massive military-industrial structure will require a new system—a new modernized approach which uses the modern systems analysis techniques and computers that feed information that can be studied and judged.

Every Senator here knows that it is difficult to attempt to face a massive, complicated defense budget with an undermanned and overworked staff. It is also difficult for the staffs to seek the necessary information from the very agency the Senator is attempting to scrutinize and regulate.

John Stuart Mill once said:

The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government.

That is what this Congress must and will do.

Fortunately, the Senate, with the aid of an excellent staff of the General Accounting Office, was able to uncover waste and inefficiency in the military procurement programs. But the GAO staff is also undermanned, overworked, and suffering from a lack of appropriations. It, too, has other responsibilities. GAO oversees all the Government's programs and, like many of us, does not have the necessary technical understanding of many of the complicated weapons programs the military argues it needs.

To give Congress the assistance it needs, I am introducing three bills today. These bills are an outgrowth of a conference on the military budget and national priorities that was held in Washington on March 28 and 29 this year.

Several members of both the House and the Senate participated in 2 days of meetings with leading scientists, weapons experts, and foreign policy scholars.

The bills introduced today, cosponsored by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MONDALE), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBY), establish some of the mechanism that the conference indicated would be helpful for giving Congress a better understanding of the complex military weaponry questions coming before it.

#### TEMPORARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION

The first of our bills, "To create a Temporary National Security Commission" would establish a Commission consisting of five Members of the House of Representatives and five from the Senate, who would then appoint six eminent citizens to serve with them. The Commission would include no more than a single member of any one standing committee of either the House or the Senate. A representative of the Comptroller General would be a 17th member, so that his available knowledge of fiscal aspects would serve the Commission and thus avoid duplicate effort.

The Temporary National Security Commission would be given until the end of the 92d Congress to perform a thorough combing over of the defense operation in all aspects and the national security operations as well.

Duties of the Temporary Commission would be to study—

(a) ... (1) what the national policy in the area of defense is now formulated to be and to evaluate such policy, and in the light of such policy whether the national interest is being properly served by the existing agencies of Government; (2) whether existing projected weapons systems, military installations and fiscal performance of such agencies properly serve national policy in the area of defense; (3) to what extent the defense establishment as an institution dwarfs individual judgment in the making and execution of policy; (4) whether relationships between agencies of the Government responsible for procurement and suppliers of goods and services require modification.

(b) to make recommendations to Congress with respect to legislation upon the foregoing subjects, including the justification and improvement of policy for national security and the effectiveness of procedures and organization in those agencies of the Government which function in the area of defense.

In sum, it is our thought that no aspect of defense or national security should be overlooked.

The concept of such a Temporary Commission of investigation sprang from the celebrated Temporary National Economic Committee set up in 1938 under Senator O'Mahoney, which conducted a study about concentration of economic power. The extensive reports that grew out of their investigations are still widely respected today.

The findings of the Temporary Committee of 1938-41 gave impetus to the antitrust prosecutions of that period. They generated the atmosphere for judicial decisions which achieved reforms in such areas as resale price maintenance, the basing-point system of pricing, and the patent system. The Committee studied the process of corporate

mergers which were dealt with in later legislation, such as the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.

Note must be taken of the fact that the President on June 30 announced the establishment of a blue-ribbon panel to conduct a year's study of the Department of Defense. The President is to be applauded for perceiving the need for such a study. But this blue-ribbon panel highlights a very serious constitutional question, namely the extent of congressional oversight of activities in the executive branch. It is our considered view that such a review of the Department of Defense would be far more fitting constitutionally, if it were conducted by the Congress.

The Temporary Commission offered in our bill would conduct a more detached analysis of defense mechanisms than a panel responsible to the same chieftains as the Department of Defense, namely, the President and the Secretary of Defense. Our Temporary Commission has a more extensive mandate than the President's panel which would survey only the Department of Defense and would concentrate on such activities as organization and management, defense research and procurement policies and practices. That leaves untended the far more profound and sensitive areas, such as national defense policy, military performance and the capability of weapons systems to fit their purposes. In these areas the Temporary Commission that we advocate would serve a broader purpose and one most vital to our national interest.

#### OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW

The second bill creates an Office of Defense Review. This would be responsible to the Congress and provide the Congress with an intimate and ongoing knowledge of defense and national security affairs as they occur. The analogy for this is the General Accounting Office. However, the Office of Defense Review would apply itself to such vital matters as the conformance of weapons systems to defense policy, and the performance of such weapons themselves in light of declared objectives and national defense policy. The bill also provides that fiscal data relating to defense and national security, already known to the General Accounting Office, and deemed to be of interest to the Office of Defense Review, shall be provided to it by General Accounting.

The Office of Defense Review would have ongoing and continuous responsibilities. A special feature of this plan for an Office of Defense Review is the requirement that it prepare a congressional defense budget, independent of the one prepared by the Executive branch. Such a concept, a congressional budget, is not new to political scientists. The purpose here is to bring to bear in the processes of congressional budgetary review the creative powers within Congress and thus highlight disparities between the congressional and executive thinking on each matter.

A prime function of the Office of Defense Review would be constant aid to congressional committees such as the Committees on Armed Services dealing

with defense and national security. The immensity and sensitivity of these great functions are such that the Congress, in order to uphold its coordinate role, should be constantly conversant with them, and thus better able to offer guidance quickly.

On Office of Defense Review should also be ready to answer questions of individual Members on matters of defense and national security. Should computers be secured, it would be possible for Congress to have its own memory banks, where data of concern to Congress, arrayed in the fashion that congressional oversight best demands, could be made instantly available.

A Director and Assistant Director of the Office of Defense Review are provided in the bill. These offices would be analogous to the Comptroller General and Assistant. They would be appointed to hold office for 4 years.

There are many other reasons for setting up the Office of Defense Review. The imperatives of the vast national defense and security effort and also the present questioning of values and performance in this area, likewise the need to reassert congressional oversight generally over executive functions, and the sophistication of techniques, the size of the operations, taken all together, are strong reasons for the establishment of Defense Review as a substantial and continuing congressional function.

The Temporary National Security Commission, being recommended in legislation simultaneous with this, should recommend new devices and ways of reviewing defense and security. However, in setting up a task force for defense review, we feel that the provision of a permanent congressional mechanism for this purpose cannot wait for the conclusion of the Temporary Commission's work more than 3 years from now. The need to review the defense and security apparatus is now.

#### THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The third proposal is a joint resolution to create a Committee on National Priorities. This, of course, goes beyond defense and national security, for it implies an overview of all national objectives and policies wherever the Government is concerned. Recently the concept of priorities has been highlighted by the growing size and significance of the military in relation to all other national activities.

This proposal provides for a Committee on Priorities of 14 members, seven from the House and seven from the other body. It would include no more than a single member of any one standing committee of either body. The members would select their chairman and vice chairman. Those offices would rotate from Congress to Congress, which is a somewhat experimental device for selection of committee leadership.

The Committee would submit to the Congress at the end of each calendar year a proposed government budget of income and expenses for a period of not less than 5 years. While this might not go to the depth and detail of line items, it would reveal to Congress the future magnitudes of projects to which Con-

gress may be induced to commit the Nation because of innocuous costs in the first year.

It is felt that such budgetary foresight will induce the Committee on Priorities to evaluate much more closely the need for weapons systems, and especially their implications within the framework of national policy. The Department of Defense does now prepare a 5-year budgetary forecast. That, however, does not necessarily correspond with future plans of other departments, nor is it made in light of national priorities. It should be checked by an independent forecast, representing a principle of congressional budgetary control that was alluded to in our comment about the Office of Defense Review.

The Committee on National Priorities would request from executive agencies and departments posture statements on their respective operations and objectives. These would help to establish priority among governmental objectives. They would enlighten the Committee, and invite criticism from the Committee. Such data and the Committee's evaluation would be passed on to Congress.

The plan provides that the Committee on Priorities shall propose legislation relating to national objectives and recommendations for action to the Congress.

The question has been raised as to whether such a Joint Committee on National Priorities may not duplicate in some measure the activities of the presently operating Joint Economic Committee. The Joint Economic Committee has established for itself a notable reputation for creative achievement. It has broadly construed its mandate in the sphere of economics. For example, we note with great interest the Joint Economic Committee's excellent report issued this year on the subject, "The Economics of Military Procurement." Certainly a Committee on Priorities would be concerned with this very same subject. However, a Committee on Priorities would be concerned with the whole gamut of national affairs, not only economic but many other matters such as national defense and security per se, conservation, health, education, communications, transport, perhaps even judicial matters, to name a few.

I ask unanimous consent that the bills and the joint resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bills and joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bills and joint resolution will be printed in the Record.

The bills (S. 3022), to create an Office of Defense Review; and (S. 3024), to establish a Temporary National Security Commission; introduced by Mr. NELSON (for himself and other Senators); was received, read twice by their title, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services; and

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 160) to create a joint congressional committee to review, and recommend changes in, national priorities and resource allocation, introduced by Mr. NELSON (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the

Committee on Government Operations; and the bills and joint resolution were ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

S. 3023

A bill to create an Office of Defense Review  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

#### DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that expenditures for military purposes are ever mounting and constitute a large fraction of total government outlays and, therefore, that it is greatly in the national interest that provisions for defense and national security be subject to continuous Congressional review to insure, for example, that arm's length relationships prevail between defense procurement agencies and suppliers of goods and services, that defense procurement costs be properly estimated in advance of commitments and reported currently, and that the performance of weapons systems and the merit of military installations be evaluated before and after procurement in order that there can be a determination as to whether they serve national policy in the area of defense and national security. To effectuate such a review, the Congress needs the assistance of an office with a continuing mission to provide reports giving independent evaluations of defense and national security matters. Such an agency could also significantly aid the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and of the House of Representatives in meeting their immense responsibilities with respect to evaluation and oversight in the area of defense.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW

SEC. 2. (a) There shall be created an establishment of the Government to be known as the Office of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Office"), which shall be independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Director of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Director"). The Director is authorized to adopt a seal for the Office.

(b) There shall be in the Office the Director and an Assistant Director of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Assistant Director"), each of whom shall be nominated by the President from a slate of candidates submitted to him under section 5(d) (4) of this Act by the Joint Board of Defense Review, and appointed by him with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the Director, and during the absence or incapacity of the Director, or during a vacancy in that office, shall act as the Director.

(c) The annual compensation of the Director shall be equal to the annual compensation of the Comptroller General of the United States. The annual compensation of the Assistant Director shall be equal to that of the Assistant Comptroller General of the United States.

(d) The Director and the Assistant Director shall be an "employee" within the meaning of such term as used in section 8331(1) of title 5, United States Code, and service performed by them shall be creditable service for all purposes of subchapter III (relating to civil service retirement) of chapter 83 of such title.

(e) The term of office of the Director and the Assistant Director shall be four years and, unless removed under subsection (f), an individual appointed to such office is not ineligible for selection under section 5(d) (4) of this Act.

(f) The Director or Assistant Director may be removed at any time by joint resolution

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S. 3024

A bill to establish a Temporary National Security Commission

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that the immense demands upon our national resources for purposes of defense and security have become a matter of deep concern in our society and that there is evidence that institutional momentum, rather than conscious policy, governs decisions relating to defense and national security. The Congress also finds that there is increasing criticism being made of the Federal agencies responsible for national defense and security with respect to their choices of weapons systems and procurement policies and practices. The Congress further finds that the rising costs of the military and the changing international situation, as well as the factors previously mentioned, require that a complete study and review of the national defense sector be immediately undertaken as a first step toward the solution of these problems.

#### ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 2. There is established a commission to be known as the Temporary National Security Commission (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Commission").

#### DUTIES OF COMMISSION

SEC. 3. It shall be the duty of the Commission—

(1) to make a full and complete study and investigation of all activities with respect to national security and defense, including, but not limited to, the operation of all agencies established in the National Security Act of 1947, and any legislation subsequent thereto providing for the coordination for national security or constituting the national military establishment, with a view to determining—

(A) what are the current national policies and objectives in the area of defense and security and, in view of such policies and objectives, whether the national interest is being properly served by the existing agencies of Government;

(B) whether existing and projected weapons systems, military installations, management procedures and fiscal performance of such agencies conform to national policy in the area of defense;

(C) to what extent the defense establishment as an institution affects individual judgment in the making and execution of policy; and

(D) whether the relationships between agencies of the Federal Government responsible for procurement and suppliers of goods and services require modification; and

(2) to make recommendations (including suggested legislation) to the Congress with respect to subjects covered in paragraph (1) particularly with regard to the improvement of policy for national security and the effectiveness of procedures and organization in those agencies of the Federal Government which function in the area of defense.

#### MEMBERSHIP

SEC. 4. (a) Number and Appointment.—The Commission shall be composed of 17 Members as follows:

(1) Five members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three from the majority party and two from the minority party.

(2) Five members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, three from the majority party and two from the minority party.

of Congress after notice and hearing, when, in the judgment of Congress, the Director or Assistant Director has become permanently incapacitated or has been inefficient, or guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment.

#### FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE

SEC. 3. It shall be the function of the Office, under the direction of the Director—

(1) to determine whether projected weapons systems and military installations accord with national policy in the area of defense;

(2) to determine whether the actual performance of procured weapons systems and installations in the area of defense is in accord with originally declared objectives and national policy in the area of defense and national security;

(3) to prepare for the Congress a defense budget for each fiscal year which shall be independent of that prepared by the executive branch and shall be available in the course of the appropriations process in Congress, for comparison with the executive defense budget;

(4) to prepare optional defense budgets based on alternative assumptions concerning policy and weapons systems for defense and national security;

(5) to report to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to other appropriate congressional committees, and to the Joint Board of Defense Review on all of the matters listed in paragraphs (1) through (4), together with (A) recommendations for conduct of national defense and security, and (B) one summary annual report to be submitted in advance of the submittal to the Congress of the annual budget of the executive branch;

(6) to provide information to individual Members of Congress, upon request, concerning matters of defense and national security; and

(7) to recommend to the Joint Board of Defense Review improvements in the operating efficiency of executive departments of the Government in the area of defense and national security.

#### POWERS OF THE OFFICE

SEC. 4. (a) In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Office is authorized—

(1) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of the operations of the Agency;

(2) subject to the civil service and classification laws, to select, appoint, employ and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and to prescribe their authority and duties;

(3) to use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of Federal and other agencies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment and facilities; and

(4) to establish such security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as it deems necessary in the interest of national security, exercising due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, and

(A) to arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of such security or other personnel investigations of the Office's employees and contractors, actual or prospective, as it deems appropriate, and

(3) if any investigation under paragraph (A) develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the subject thereof is of questionable loyalty, to refer the matter to

the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Office.

(b) Upon the request of the Director—

(1) the head of any department or agency in the executive branch shall furnish to the Director copies of any report submitted by such department or agency to the Comptroller General of the United States if the Director deems such report to be of consequence in the area of defense and national security, and

(2) the Comptroller General of the United States shall furnish to the Director copies of analyses of expenditures prepared by the General Accounting Office with respect to any department or agency in the executive branch if the Defense Review Director deems such analyses to be of consequence in the area of defense and national security.

(c)(1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Director reports of all exceptions taken by the Comptroller General to the financial or other activities of any department or agency in the executive branch in the area of defense and national security, and also reports of any settlements or conclusions reached by the Comptroller General with respect to such exceptions.

(2) The Comptroller General shall transmit to the Director copies of all reports prepared by the Comptroller General pursuant to section 283 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 103).

#### JOINT BOARD OF DEFENSE REVIEW

SEC. 5. (a) There is hereby established a Joint Board of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this section as the "Board") to be composed of three members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and three members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In the case of the members appointed from each house of the Congress, the majority party shall be represented by two members and the minority party represented by one member. No standing committee of the Senate or House may be represented by more than one member on the Board at any time.

(b) Members of the Board shall serve for terms of no longer than a total of five sessions of Congress. The Board shall select a chairman and vice chairman from among its members. Members of the Board shall receive no additional compensation on account of their service on the Board but shall be reimbursed for travel and other expenses incurred while performing work as members of the Board.

(c) A member of the Board may, when unable to attend a meeting of the Board, authorize another such member to act for him in his absence. A vacancy in the Board shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the Board, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original selection. Four members shall constitute a quorum of the Board. Decisions of the Board shall be taken by majority vote and a tie vote shall be decided according to the vote of the chairman, or, in his absence, the vice chairman.

(d) It shall be the function of the Board—

(1) to receive reports from the Director relating to his activities,

(2) to aid the Director in the interpretation of national defense policy,

(3) otherwise to counsel and advise the Director in the performance of his duties, and

(4) in the event of a vacancy in the office of Director or Assistant Director, to submit to the President the names of five individuals who, in the judgment of the Board, are qualified to hold such office.



(3) Six individuals from private life to be appointed, with due regard given to insuring a balance of political viewpoint, by the members of Congress appointed under paragraph (1) and (2).

(4) One representative of the General Accounting Office to be appointed by the Comptroller General of the United States.

A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect the power of the remaining Members to execute the functions of the Commission and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. At no time may any one standing committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives be represented by more than one individual chosen pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2). Individuals from private life appointed under paragraph (3) shall be appointed for the life of the Commission and shall be of acknowledged eminence in fields of study or activity of national importance.

(b) Compensation and Travel Expenses.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), Members of the Commission shall each be entitled to receive \$150 for each day (including travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(2) A Member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1), (2), or (4) of the subsection (a) shall receive no additional compensation on account of his service on the Commission.

(3) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, Members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as the expenses authorized by section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

(c) Quorum.—Nine Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, and actions by the Commission shall be determined by a majority vote of the Members present.

(d) Chairman.—The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Commission shall be elected by the Members of the Commission from among those Members appointed under paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (a).

(e) Meetings.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman or a majority of its Members.

(f) Any Member of the Commission may, if unable to attend a meeting of the Commission, authorize another Member to act and vote for him in his absence.

#### STAFF OF COMMISSION

SEC. 5. (a) Staff.—The Commission may appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable.

(b) Applicability of civil service laws.—The staff of the Commission may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(c) Security requirements.—The Commission shall establish such security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as it deems necessary in the interest of national security. The Commission may arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of such security or other personnel investigations of the Commission's employees, consultants, and contractors, actual or prospective, as it deems appropriate. If any such investigation develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the subject thereof is of questionable loyalty, the matter shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Commission.

#### POWERS OF COMMISSION

SEC. 6. (a) Hearings and Sessions.—The Commission may for the purpose of carrying out this Act hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission may deem advisable. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it.

(b) Subpoena Power.—

(1) The Commission shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter which the Commission is empowered to investigate by section 3. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(2) If a person issued a subpoena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey such subpoena or is guilty of contumacy, any court of the United States within the judicial district within which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial district within which such person is found or resides or transacts business may (upon application by the Commission) order such person to appear before the Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

(3) The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a District Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts.

(4) All process of any court to which application may be made under this section may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(c) Immunity.—No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(d) Powers of Members, Subcommittees and Agents.—When so authorized by the Commission, any Member, subcommittee, or agent of the Commission may take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section.

(e) Obtaining Official Data.—The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Commission such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission. During the course of its investigations and deliberations, and in making its reports, findings, and recommendations, the Commission shall exercise due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "classified information" means information which is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a department or agency of the United States for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.

(f) The Commission is authorized to enter into contracts with qualified educational in-

stitutions, other public or private organizations or agencies, or individuals for the preparation of studies related to the Commission's duties, except that any contract entered into under this subsection shall require that the services contracted for be completed before January 1, 1973.

#### AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 7. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

#### REPORTS

SEC. 8. Before January 1, 1971, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress preliminary reports of the studies and investigations carried on by it, together with its findings and recommendations, and shall transmit to the President and to the Congress before January 1, 1973, the final reports on the studies and investigations carried out by it pursuant to this Act, together with its final recommendations transmitted by it pursuant to this section at the time of such transmittal, except that the Commission shall withhold from the text of reports and recommendations made available to the public or transmitted to the Congress any part thereof the release of which, in the Commission's judgment, would be detrimental to national security.

#### TERMINATION

SEC. 9. The Commission shall cease to exist on December 31, 1972.

#### S.J. RES. 160

A joint resolution to create a joint congressional committee to review, and recommend changes in, national priorities and resource allocation

Whereas national objectives, to the extent that they are affected by action of the Federal Government, ought to be more clearly formulated; and

Whereas national objectives can be realized only if all competing demands for priority in the allocation of resources disposed of by the Federal Government can be reconciled on a continuing basis; and

Whereas the immense demands upon national resources for purposes of defense and national security have become a matter of deep concern in our society; and

Whereas the Congress can meet its constitutional obligation as a coordinate branch of the Government more fully if it will consider the overall relationship of the many separate legislative demands: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That there is hereby created a joint congressional committee to be known as the Joint Committee on National Priorities (hereafter referred to in this joint resolution as the "joint committee") to be composed of seven Members of the Senate to be designated by the President of the Senate and seven Members of the House of Representatives to be designated by the Speaker. Of the seven Members appointed from each house of the Congress, the majority party shall be represented by four members and the minority party shall be represented by three members. No one standing committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives may be represented by more than one Member on the joint committee at any time.

SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized—

(1) to suggest national objectives and, on a current and continuing basis, to examine these objectives as they are affected by actions of the Federal Government;

(2) in the light of the examinations undertaken in paragraph (1), to suggest national priorities and to recommend, on a continuing basis, the allocation of resources disposed of

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by the Federal Government to such national priorities;

(3) to obtain from the departments and agencies in the executive branch annual posture statements on the operations and objectives of the departments and agencies as they relate to such national priorities and to assess such statements;

(4) to suggest legislation that will contribute to the attainment of national objectives; and

(5) to recommend courses of action, based on its findings and investigations, in the national interest to departments and agencies in the executive branch, to the States and political subdivisions thereof, and to regional agencies.

(b) The joint committee shall, before the close of each calendar year, submit to the Congress a posture statement on national priorities, which shall include a proposed Federal budget of income and expenditures covering a period of not less than the five consecutive fiscal years next succeeding the calendar year in which the posture statement is submitted.

Sec. 3. (a) A vacancy in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the powers of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members; except that no member may serve as chairman or vice chairman for longer than one Congress.

(b) An individual is not eligible to be a member of the joint committee after such individual has served as such a member for a total of eight sessions of Congress. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, service on the the joint committee for a full session of Congress or part of a session shall count as one session of service.

Sec. 4. In addition to the reports required under section 2, the members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives on the results of the joint committee's studies and investigations, together with their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 5. In carrying out its duties, the joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings or investigations, to sit and act at such places and times, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The joint committee may make such rules respecting its organization and procedures as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman of the joint committee or by any member designated by him or by the joint committee, and may be served by such person or persons as may be designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. The provisions of section 192 and 194 of title 2, United States Code, shall apply in case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section. The cost of stenographic service to report public hearings shall not be an excess of the amounts prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing committees of the Senate. The cost of stenographic service to report executive hearings shall be fixed at an amount not to exceed the cost of stenographic service to the joint committee. Members of the joint committee, and its

employees and consultants, while traveling on official business for the joint committee, may receive either the per diem allowance authorized to be paid to Members of Congress or its employees, or their actual and necessary expenses provided an itemized statement of such expenses is attached to the voucher.

Sec. 6. The joint committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and staff employees as it deems necessary and advisable. The joint committee is authorized (1) to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government and (2) to contract with educational institutions, public or private agencies or organizations, or individuals for the conduct of research or studies with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 7. The joint committee shall establish such security requirements, restrictions and safeguards over its records as it deems necessary in the interest of national security, exercising due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence. All committee records, data, charts, and files shall be the property of the joint committee and shall be kept in the offices of the joint committee or other places as the joint committee may direct under such security safeguards as the joint committee shall determine in the interest of the common defense and security.

Sec. 8. The expenses of the joint committee shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman of the joint committee or by any member of the joint committee duly authorized by the chairman.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION

S. 641

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of my colleague, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN) be added as a cosponsor of S. 641, to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961 in order to permit borrowers obtaining loans under such act to employ attorneys of their own choice to perform necessary legal services in connection with such loans.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2893

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) be added as a cosponsor of S. 2893, to amend the act of June 27, 1960 (74 Stat. 220), relating to the preservation of historical and archaeological data.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 158

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, my name be added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 158, to authorize the minting of clad silverless dollars bearing the likeness of the late President of the United States, Dwight David Eisenhower.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 271—SUBMISSION OF RESOLUTION ON PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. DOLE, for himself and other Senators, submitted a resolution on peace in Vietnam.

(The remarks of Mr. DOLE when he submitted the resolution appear later in the Record under the appropriate heading.)

#### DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 231

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I rise today to submit an amendment intended to be proposed by me to H.R. 13111, a bill making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare for fiscal year 1970. My amendment is very simple. It will have the effect of increasing by \$20 million the total amount of funds made available for parts C, D, and F of the Education Professions Development Act, with the additional \$20 million earmarked for the development of personnel in vocational-technical education. Currently the U.S. Office of Education has indicated an intention to spend only \$5,750,000 for training vocational education personnel. There is ample evidence that this sum is totally inadequate, and my amendment proposes to earmark the additional funds so that our educational system can begin to attract new personnel to the field of vocational-technical education, and in order that existing vocational personnel might be upgraded and retrained.

Mr. President, my colleagues in the Senate who are concerned about the problems posed by increased inflation may question my introduction of this amendment. I share their concern and I must admit that I have been hesitant about supporting increased spending at this time. I am, however, persuaded that there is an overwhelming and critical need for additional training funds to meet the personnel needs in vocational and technical education. These needs are especially severe in my own State of California.

I introduce my amendment at this time in order to bring this matter to the immediate attention of my colleagues. The Senate Labor-HEW Appropriations Subcommittee, so ably chaired by the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) will begin hearings on H.R. 13111 this month. In the interim, however, I hope that the other Members of the Senate will investigate the training needs for vocational-technical personnel in their own States and will come to the support of my amendment.

There is no lack of facts to substantiate the need for increased and improved vocational-technical education programs throughout the country. These facts have been presented to Congress before, and they clearly and persuasively indicate that education in the United States does not meet the needs of the majority of American youth. For example: 80 percent of American youth in 1966 left school

A recent book by a group of young doctors says that the most important step toward birth control is education. They say: "Every one has heard of the pill, but only one woman in 1,000 knows exactly what contraception is about."

There is no real sex education in French schools, and contraception remains largely a taboo subject.

After the pill, the next most favored method of contraception in France is the intrauterine loop. Women who prefer the loop do so because it can become a permanent method once it has been inserted by a doctor. However, the loop has to be checked every six months, and cannot be used by all women.

A recent test of loop insertions revealed 8.4 per cent expulsions, 0.2 per cent infections, 4.1 percent heavy bleeding, and 2.22 per cent pregnancies. Other tests indicated that pregnancies during use of the pill were only 0.15 per cent.

Abortion is forbidden in France. However, official figures show that there are about 250,000 induced abortions annually. Unofficial sources put this figure at a total of 1 million.

The Conseil National de l'ordre des Medecins, France's highest medical authority, last year rejected proposals from a commission on population problems to liberalize the law against abortions. The law is even less likely to be changed since the latest Papal Encyclical on birth control.

#### BONN

Contraceptives of all kinds are easily available in West Germany. The pill has been in use since 1962 and is gaining in popularity. About 1.4 million women—13 per cent—in the age group from 16 to 45 take the pill.

Abortions are illegal, except when decreed by doctors to save the life of a mother or for other ethical reasons. Nevertheless, the abortion rate in West Germany is described as alarmingly high. For every 1 million live births, unofficial estimates indicate that there are 200,000 to 1.5 million abortions annually.

Sprays, the loop and other devices are no longer in favor, since they are considered too bothersome and not 100 per cent effective.

Recent polls show that the majority of all young West German couples desire at least two children, but prefer to space them according to their professional and family plans. Even young Catholic couples say: "We prefer to have the pill and not play Roman roulette."

#### ROME

In Italy—right on the Vatican's doorstep—any kind of "artificial" birth control is illegal, but the practice flourishes just the same.

In a nation where nearly 100 per cent of the people are at least nominal Roman Catholics, abortion is widespread and use of the pill is becoming more and more popular. There is no evidence to show that the papal encyclical on birth control has caused any diminution of these practices.

In fact, it is noted by an official of the Italian equivalent of the Family Planning Association that the encyclical produced such a flood of publicity in the Italian press—where the actual advertising of contraceptive devices is also illegal—that it might have even acted as a spur to their use.

Despite the ban on contraceptive devices, the pill is easy to get in Italy. This is because it can legally be prescribed as a remedy for any woman suffering from any gynecological disorder. There are at least eight different brands of the pill on sale in Italian drugstores.

Doctors appear in general to have no compunction about prescribing the pill, even when they know it will be put to contraceptive use. Drugstores are similarly permissive. It is not uncommon for pharmacists

to sell the pill across the counter without a prescription.

Use of the birth-control pill still tends to be confined mainly to the more educated, middle-class Italians. The loop is relatively unknown here.

Abortion, though outlawed, has been practiced for centuries among rich and poor alike. One source estimates that at least 1 million abortions are carried out in Italy each year. An illegal abortion is said to cost about \$128 at current rates, and clinics where such operations are performed are easy to find.

Thus, despite the church ban on birth-control devices—and the ostensible illegality of them—Catholic Italy has a birth rate not much higher than Britain's.

#### STOCKHOLM

Birth-control methods, including legal abortion and sterilization, have long been used in Sweden and elsewhere in Scandinavia.

Experience in Sweden shows clearly that sex education in schools and easy access to contraceptives at low cost do not guarantee effective birth control. Social misfits, mentally retarded people and many youngsters fail to use contraceptives—often under the influence of liquor.

Widespread use of the pill in recent years has been charged with an alarming increase in venereal diseases. Reported cases of gonorrhea after the vacation period in 1968 were running up to 50 per cent higher than a year ago. Syphilis, too, is spreading again.

At the same time, the pill has failed to reduce the number of illegitimate births and abortions. In Sweden, the total of illegitimate births rose from 11,500 in 1960 to 18,000 in 1966.

Under a liberal abortion law, applications for legal abortions climbed from a temporary low of 4,085 in 1960 to 7,380 in 1967. As many as 95 per cent of all applications were granted last year, as against 62 per cent in 1960. Legal abortions are free under Government welfare programs.

Contrary to popular belief, Sweden does not permit abortions for foreigners except in emergency cases. Many American women who have tried to get legal abortions here have been rejected.

Despite the liberal attitude prevailing in Scandinavia, the number of illegal abortions is surprising high—up to 20,000 a year in Sweden.

A Swedish law of 1941 also permits sterilization for eugenic, social or moral reasons. Over the past 15 years, about 25,000 persons have been sterilized—90 per cent on medical grounds.

#### BUCHAREST

Communist governments in Eastern Europe encourage people to have more children by paying subsidies to mothers of big families, and by providing nurseries and kindergartens where working mothers may leave their children. In Russia, for example, more than 3.5 million mothers of four or more children are drawing monthly state subsidies.

Many different kinds of contraceptives are available. So is instruction in their use by gynecologists and midwives. However, contraceptives often are of poor quality and are not produced in sufficient quantity.

Accordingly, there is widespread incentive to resort to abortion. Recognizing this, and hoping to keep down the number of abortions performed on the sly under dangerous medical conditions, most Communist governments have adopted easy abortion policies. The one exception is Rumania, where—in 1966—abortions were outlawed except for rare cases.

Except in Poland and East Germany, a fee is charged for voluntary abortions, while abortion on medical grounds is free in all countries.

The Soviet Union recently decided to begin mass manufacture of intrauterine devices,

after its Health Ministry ruled against the pill as a contraceptive for health reasons.

#### CAIRO

Despite having one of the world's most serious population problems, Egypt's Government has not given birth control high priority.

And, without Government action, little can be done in this field, since the masses of people with the largest families—the peasants—do not have the knowledge or means to act on their own.

At present, both the pill and intrauterine devices are slowly being introduced. About 300,000 women are taking the pill, but this is still less than 4 per cent of the "target group"—fertile women with at least two children—that the program is trying to reach. Experts say it is unlikely that this number will ever increase very much, because of shortages in the supply of pill ingredients, and because so little is being done to promote the desirability of birth control. Use of the loop also is on a very modest scale.

Unlike the situation in Catholic countries, there is no major religious obstacle to overcome in mainly Moslem Egypt. But there are superstition and suspicion to cope with. Many Egyptians—including "intellectuals"—believe that Western emphasis on the desirability of birth control is just a plot to keep underdeveloped countries such as Egypt from becoming big countries.

#### OTTAWA

Growing use of the pill and other birth-control measures, in spite of strong laws against the sale of contraceptives and against the dissemination of birth-control information, is believed to be a major cause of Canada's declining birth rate in recent years.

The laws are generally disregarded, except in areas where the Catholic Church is strong, such as in rural parts of Quebec Province. No one has been prosecuted in Canada for the illegal sale of contraceptives since 1961.

The birth-control laws, as well as Canada's law prohibiting abortion, are being changed. New provisions of the Food and Drugs Act will permit sale and dissemination of birth-control medicines, instruments and information.

A new law on abortion will permit establishment of a "therapeutic-abortion committee" in each hospital. The committee would be empowered to approve abortions in any case where continued pregnancy "would or would be likely to endanger life or health."

#### MEXICO CITY

Birth-control work in Mexico consists of training and research programs and clinics throughout a country where the population is growing at a rate of 3.5 per cent a year. Control methods are the pill, intrauterine devices, injections and the rhythm method—for those who prefer it, and their number is small.

It is estimated that 1 million women are using the pill. Results are described as highly satisfactory, with only minor side effects which decrease with use.

The programs are sponsored by private organizations. The Mexican Government, anxious to avoid conflicts with the Roman Catholic Church, is not involved.

Use of the intrauterine loop is growing, although one doctor describes it as "good for some women and not for others."

Clinics in Mexico now are working with three types of contraceptive injections—effective for one month, two months or three months. The results are reported good, especially with women who are incapable of remembering to take pills regularly.

The rate of abortion in Mexico is estimated at one for each live birth.

#### RIO DE JANEIRO

Latin-American women are showing increasing determination to limit the size of

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their families by whatever means are available.

Abortion is the most common form of birth control, especially in the big cities, but the pill is catching up, particularly in the middle and upper income groups. Intrauterine loops are the most controversial, and the rhythm system is the most discredited.

The Brazilian Family Welfare Society estimates that 4,000 abortions a day—about 1.5 million annually—are performed in Brazil. This works out to be one abortion for three live births.

The ratio is reversed in neighboring Uruguay, where there are three abortions for each live birth. Other South American countries fall in between.

Brazil has a constitutional ban on the distribution of contraceptives or birth-control information through the mails or in public. But doctors say that family-planning clinics are allowed to operate without interference, in the hope that they will reduce the abortion rate.

The loop is widely used in Chile, where one doctor devised a low-cost loop made of nylon fishing line. The pill is described as the overwhelming favorite among Argentine women, most of whom use some form of birth control.

The Family Welfare Society in Rio de Janeiro estimates that 1.5 million Brazilian women—almost 10 per cent of the 18 million women of childbearing age—use the pill and many other contraceptives.

#### TOKYO

In Asia, most countries are trying to contain populations which are increasing 3 per cent or more a year. But finding effective ways is proving difficult.

Two or three years ago, the intrauterine device was hailed as revolutionary—the cheapest, easiest way to cut the number of births to reasonable levels. Asia, with at least 2 million insertions, has become the largest market in the world for the loops.

Today, enthusiasm for the loops has waned. Results have been less than satisfactory. Some programs have been supplemented with the more expensive, more controversial pill.

Experts ask, what are the alternatives? Older contraceptive methods are unreliable. Injections and experiments with "immunization" are inadequately tested. The conclusion now being reached by leaders in family planning:

Induced abortion may be the only effective means of reducing population, particularly in areas of the world where education standards are low and poverty is widespread.

In three Asian countries, abortion is already considered the most dependable check on spiraling populations.

Japan pioneered, legalizing the operation in 1948. Abortion by qualified doctors gets major credit for reducing the birth rate to a modest 1 per cent gain per year—one of the lowest in the world.

In two neighboring countries, abortion is illegal but widely practiced. An estimated one out of every three pregnancies in South Korea is now terminated by abortion. The cost is \$3 to \$8. In Taiwan, abortion—costing about \$6—is at least as important as the loop in curbing population growth.

Family-planning programs have been under way in Taiwan since 1964, with the aim of reducing the population growth rate from 3 to 2 per cent a year. Results of a program to insert 600,000 loops by 1970 have been mixed. Many women complain about them for one reason or another, and the retention rate is only 60 per cent after 18 months.

The Republic of Korea has had comparable experience with a program begun in 1962. Over 1 million loops have been inserted, but at least 2 out of every 10 are removed for various reasons.

Both countries are supplementing their IUD programs with pills, a more complicated and costly procedure.

#### BANGKOK

In South Asia, the world's most critical area of population growth, only three countries—India, Pakistan and Singapore—have national programs aimed at controlling births. Malaysia is beginning one.

The Philippine Republic has no program, and is further inhibited because about 85 per cent of its population is Catholic and leans toward the "conservative" wing of the Church.

Thailand, a relatively underpopulated country by Asian standards, but one which is beginning to feel the pinch of population versus agricultural productivity, has no program yet. Indonesia, a nation of more than 110 million people and a high-density population in some areas, has no program worth mentioning.

Pakistan and India—both growing rapidly—have had major birth-control programs for years. But neither has made much of a dent in its birth rate.

Pakistan aims to have 5 million couples of childbearing age practicing birth control regularly by 1970. Right now, it looks as if the goal will be met. Some 2.4 million couples have begun some form of birth control: the loop, the pill or conventional contraceptives. In addition, 180,000 men and women have been sterilized.

India's program is 15 years old, but the population is nevertheless growing at a rate of about 2.5 per cent a year—and threatens to climb to 3 per cent, which could mean disaster.

At first, the loop was seen as the answer to India's control needs, but results have been disappointing. Now, sterilization is being stressed, and a "finder's fee" of \$1.33 is being offered to anyone who brings a person to a clinic for the simple operation.

**THE SPEAKER.** Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. HANNA) is recognized for 1 hour.

[Mr. HANNA addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

**THE SPEAKER.** Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. DUNCAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. DUNCAN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

### CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES

**THE SPEAKER.** Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this morning at a news conference our colleague, GEORGE BROWN, spoke for myself as well as for Congressmen PHILLIP BURTON, BOB ECKHARDT, DON EDWARDS, DON FRASER, BOB KASTENMEIER, ABNER J. MIKVA, BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, and WILLIAM F. RYAN in announcing the forthcoming introduction of legislation to create an Office of Defense Review, a Joint Committee on National Priorities,

and a temporary Commission on National Security.

As one of the first Members of this House to vote against military appropriation increases, GEORGE BROWN conveyed eloquently the urgency we all feel in making the Congress more responsive to the needs of his Nation and capable of reasserting a leadership role. Since his statement articulately describes the immediate events surrounding the need for structural change in Congress, I would like at this point to place his remarks in the Record:

#### REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN GEORGE BROWN

The most urgent challenge confronting Congress today is the reassertion of its constitutional function—controlling the power to declare war. Over the next few days great attention will focus on Vietnam and the insanity of the tragic adventurism which seems to be our major national pursuit. Many Congressmen endorsed resolutions supporting current efforts to redirect thinking on Vietnam and overall military/foreign policy. Yet last week many of these same men stood mute when the House of Representatives went through the motions of debating and passing a military authorization bill of \$21.3 billion. During general debate the procurement bill was discussed at a rate of \$5.3 billion per hour. Efforts to cut the bill were repeatedly defeated. The military authorization bills make up 70% of Congressional control over Federal expenditures. If Congress gives up 70% of its power, it obviously is unable to bring decisive weight on other areas and programs that so desperately need support.

At a time when at least ten million Americans are victims of hunger or chronic malnutrition and at least double that number exist in substandard housing, we wonder about the order of priorities in this "most affluent nation". We see something gravely wrong when the supposed representatives of the people can devote only one and one quarter minutes to an amendment eliminating purchase of twenty-three additional planes which have serious defects and are part of an overall strategy which was rejected by many military analysts. One Congressman found that just one of these planes, the \$43 million C5A, would build four and one half schools in his district each capable of educating 1,000 people annually for 30 years.

At a time when a recent Gallup Poll indicated that a majority of American people feel that the military budget is too large, we must seriously question a Congress which approves almost exactly what the Pentagon requests. Indeed Congress tends towards extreme overgenerosity; in the House, an extra billion dollars for ship procurement was added to the original DOD request.

Who are we to be making these statements? We are men who have opposed involvement in Vietnam and S. E. Asia from its very beginning. We have consistently voted against appropriations for that war and against an escalating military budget.\*

However, votes are not control. We can no longer remain silent about the inability of Congress to assert its constitutional responsibilities.

Despite the greatest outcry since World War II about the size and content of the military budget, many members have remained almost totally oblivious to the growing

\* 1966 Vote in Vietnam Supplemental 393-4. Brown, Burton, Conyers, Ryan voting Nay. 1967 Military Procurement bill 401-3, Brown, Edwards, Fraser voting Nay. 1968 Military Procurement bill 363-15. 1969 Military Procurement bill 311-44.



malaise and increasing dissent outside the insulated halls of Congress. We can no longer ignore the need for structural change which would make Congress responsible to the needs of our society and capable of providing leadership. As men in public office we bear special responsibility to address ourselves to problems of institutional failure. For these reasons we have authored these bills.

The three bills which are being introduced in the House by Representatives Mikva, Ryan, Eckhardt and in the Senate by Senators Nelson and McGovern would create three new informational and auditing bodies directly responsible to Congress rather than to the Executive Branch. They result from a meeting last March of the Congressional Conference on Military Budget and National Priorities which brought together scholars, economists, former government leaders and members of Congress to assess the fundamental nature of change in American government and to ask some basic questions about economic, political and corporate institutions.

Because of the urgency of these questions and the crucial need to link the generalities surrounding the Vietnam war and military policies to the specifics of institutional change we have published the complete deliberations of the Conference. The book titled *American Militarism 1970*, will be released tomorrow by Viking Press.

A chapter dealing with new leadership in Congress discusses the necessity for a Congressionally-responsible Office of Defense Review, for a Joint Committee on National Priorities to examine total demands on the Federal budget, and for a Temporary Commission on National Security to determine the real security components of this nation.

The need for such new structures can no longer be ignored. Last week five dissenting members of the Armed Services Committee made a responsible effort to cut or slow down programs which are exorbitantly expensive and are extremely dubious in effectiveness. The results of their efforts are important for anyone interested in the future of representative government.

The House Armed Services Committee did not furnish its printed hearings—2,666 pages in length—to the House membership until three days before debate began. With barely any time to become acquainted with the voluminous material Congressmen consistently voted on items they knew nothing about. Crucial material was either "classified" or "top secret". Arguments on weapons systems which are of critical importance in the arms race were decided on emotional arguments such as the distinguished Chairman's argument that "if we can go to the moon we can build the ABM". Debate on an amendment to cut back on the controversial air defense system was allotted 45 seconds per man. Virtually all votes on these amendments were by division or teller—a means by which no record is kept of how individual members acted.

The simple fact is that responsibility for our enormous military budget, larger than China's total GNP, results not from uniformed military but from civilian leadership. The military-industrial establishment is not a conspiracy. It is an enormous, self-perpetuating institutional organism receiving such a disproportionate amount of Federal funds that it overwhelms all opposition. Decisions on issues such as the war in Vietnam and the ABM are generated from institutional momentum rather than as a result of conscious policy. Reassertion of control over this enormous bureaucracy is certainly not the job of Congress alone. But it must start here. Congress must translate public anxieties into political understanding. It is why we are here today—to try to begin that process.

The three bills which have been introduced today by Congressmen Bob Eck-

HARDT, ABNER MIKVA, and WILLIAM F. RYAN with 29 cosponsors would create an Office of Defense Review, a Joint Committee on National Priorities and a Temporary Commission on National Security.

The bills are being offered in the other body by Senators GAYLORD NELSON, GEORGE MCGOVERN, WALTER F. MONDALE, and WILLIAM B. SAXBE.

#### GENESIS OF NEW PROPOSALS

The genesis of the three bills goes back to a conference on the military budget and national priorities that was held in Washington on March 28 and 29 of this year. Many Members of the House and also Members of the other body served as sponsors of the conference. Many scholars participated, eminent in the fields of political science and pure science. A consensus of the conference developed amongst the congressional sponsors. On June 1, 36 of the the Members of this body and nine of the other body issued a report which outlined the problems of the military budget and offered six recommendations for reasserting control of that budget and providing congressional leadership. In attempting to implement the recommendations of that report, we undertook a comprehensive review of the need for structural change within Congress. We found that Congress itself has by inaction contributed to Executive growth, to inflation of the Defense Department and to congressional decline. I would like to include parts of that study in the Record:

#### RESTORING CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES

It is our purpose to re-assert the function of Congress as a co-ordinate branch of the government. We believe that the intention of the Founding Fathers, when they devoted Article I to the Congress, was to establish this body at a level no less than that of the Executive or the Judicial.

Unfortunately, many signs point to the dismal fact that Congress does not today enjoy that eminence.

An acute observer of our government today is Professor Alfred deGrazia. In his monograph, "Toward a New Model of Congress," published by the American Enterprise Institute in 1966, he stated:

"It is the consensus of the men who have undertaken the present study of Congress that the institutions of American government are currently being changed in a manner that is unsatisfactory. They believe, indeed, that in the course of the very attempt to cope with the major issues of our age three additional problems have been created.

"The first of these is the danger represented by an excessive reliance for the handling of all issues on an escalating bureaucracy, consisting of huge agencies of permanent civil servants who are not made effectively responsible to the larger society. The second is the danger of the kind of militarism that arises in the course of efforts to solve the issues of foreign affairs and their related domestic aspects. The third problem results from the increase of presidential personalism: the exaltation of an office above its stated powers and the capacities of the incumbent, which poses a veritable threat of dictatorship—or whatever one may wish to call the phenomenon of the people's overly great dependence upon the magical qualities of a person occupying an outstandingly prominent office.

"Thus to the list of the major problems of our age must be added these three problems of government, which are uniquely characteristic of contemporary times. As these problems worsen, the fate of Congress

and the whole concept of the legislative way of life are thrown into jeopardy. But on the other hand, the very solution to these problems lies in the strengthening of Congress. For if Congress can be made to work well—that is, if it can be sufficiently powered, properly staffed and financed, and rationally directed—then not only will the American democratic republic continue to stand, but it will prove fully adequate to its tasks of government both now and in the future."

Dr. James A. Robinson, a notable authority on the subject of Congress, observed that "Much of the decline must be attributed to the profound change in the requirements of public policy making, and to the failure of Congress to alter its organization to cope with the new demands made upon it." Further, he says, "It is not known what Congress' primary sources of information were at the beginning of this century, but as already noted it is clear that today its primary source is the executive branch. Indeed, Congress has no independent information sources." ("Decision making in Congress" American Enterprise Institute 1966.)

Today it is commonplace for a Secretary of the Department of Defense to hand down pronouncements on U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, on matters of defense, Congressmen are expected to vote on details that they are not supposed to know about. Deliberations of the Congressional committees on defense affairs are constantly conducted in executive session, preventing public scrutiny of many defense problems. Requests to the Congress for authorization of expenditures for weapons systems contain little reference to policy. At least this is true of the committee reports that finally enlighten Congressional members in advance of their voting. Here, if anywhere, the relationship of weapons systems to policy should be plainly stated.

It is highly significant that the Executive Branch operates about 4,000 computers, many of them in the area of defense, while Congress has but one or two.

Congress should reassess the posture of our national defense and national security, and examine the several agencies and departments active in those areas. We want national priorities to be defined so that defense does not secure an irretrievable first priority, monopolizing our national resources, both human and material.

There is no doubt that the three legislative proposals come at a time when many abuses, errors and shortfalls have disclosed numerous and substantial faults in the area of defense and national security.

If it appears that they take advantage of a weak moment in the history of defense in the U.S., they certainly occur during a weak period in the history of the Congress. They are intended to redress that weakness.

Reasons to question activities in the area of defense and national security are not hard to find. We will not dwell on the recent sinking of the submarine "Guitarro" at her dock in Vallejo, or the tragic landing in the Bay of Pigs, or the evident effort to cover up billions of dollars in over-spending for the C-5A transport plane, or the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-111 plane incidents. In a recent subcommittee report on the precipitate mass production of the tank and missile system, the following observation appears, "Under such circumstances the Project Manager became more of a captive than a manager of his project. . . ." How characteristic that observation is of the widespread subordination of individual decision to the inertial force of the defense Frankenstein. This condition is deplorable enough when it occurs at the technical level of project management. Yet the condition is even more so when it touches on selection of a massive weapons system such as the FDL, fast deployment logistics vessels, which would have a great deal to do with national policy. In this case, the system was plainly chosen without any

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national decision to proceed with the highly provocative national policy that the FDL vessels would have implemented.

Even at the top-most levels where the very broadest decisions of national policy are supposedly to be made, there is very little evidence that individual leaders express judgments independent of the institutions to which they are attached.

Needless to say, the diminution of individuals in the face of institutional immensity, and the paralysis of independent judgment have consequences that go far beyond the disposition of our military resources. To a great extent the totality of our national resources, both human and material, have been subordinated to military priorities. Thus the whole subject of national priorities is laid wide open.

#### TEMPORARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, civilian control over the military is a fundamental precept of a democracy. Yet, since World War II civilian control has eroded as American society has become increasingly militarized, and the military-industrial complex, of which President Eisenhower warned, has achieved greater and greater power.

In the belief that Congress must exercise control over military policy and use available technical and scholarly expertise in analyzing the military budget and the policies which determine our priorities, two Senators and eight Members of the House initiated the congressional conference on the military budget and national priorities which was held in Washington last March 28 and 29.

Our conference set the stage for the debates on the military budget which later occurred in both the Senate and the House. Upon the conclusion of the conference we issued a report which made a number of recommendations for restoring democratic control over the military budget. The report of the congressional sponsors and excerpts from the conference deliberations have been published in book form by the Viking Press. The title is "American Militarism 1970," and I commend it to my colleagues.

We have put certain recommendations of the conference into legislative form and have introduced three bills today intended to reassert civilian control over the military.

Today I have introduced, together with 28 of my colleagues in the House and four Members of the Senate, a bill to create a Temporary National Security Commission. Simultaneously, the same Members of Congress have introduced two other bills. One would create an Office of Defense Review. The other is a joint resolution to create a Joint Congressional Committee on National Priorities.

The establishment of the Temporary National Security Commission will enable Congress to assert its proper role in the determination of foreign and military policy. The post-World War II assumptions upon which our national security establishment is predicated need

to be reassessed. The world has been radically transformed since the late 1940's. The Temporary National Security Commission would examine the institutional structure of the military-industrial complex, the relation between military policy and the economic interests which depend on the Military Establishment, and the economic and social impact of the military-industrial complex.

Although the United States has a greater military influence around the world than any other country, we feel insecure. While we have been powerful militarily, our prestige and our position of leadership have suffered because of our misguided intervention in Vietnam. It is time for a complete reevaluation of the foreign policy considerations upon which military decisions have been made.

This legislative package should provide Congress with the means to analyze the national security establishment and reassess the role of the military within the overall framework of national priorities. The tragic war in Vietnam and the ABM issue have awakened the American people to the imbalance in our national priorities, and they are deeply concerned about the magnitude of the military budget and the neglect of urgent domestic needs. The military-industrial complex, powerful as it is—in this fiscal year some 56 percent of controllable Federal expenditures are budgeted for it—is no longer sacrosanct. The long fight in the Senate over the ABM and other weapons systems and the serious effort in the House to amend the military procurement authorization bill, although they did not succeed, made it clear that Congress is beginning to reassert its constitutional role.

On October 15, there will be a day of moratorium to protest the continued sacrifice of life and treasure 10,000 miles from our shores in a war which has never been justified to the American people. The outpouring of citizen concern over Vietnam, the ABM, and our distorted priorities, makes it imperative that Congress bring under control the vast array of executive agencies which are responsible for our national security.

The first step is to study all aspects of national security and military policy including the agencies established in the National Security Act and subsequently. That is the purpose of the bill to set up a Temporary National Security Commission.

The Temporary National Security Commission would consist of 17 members, five Senators and five Members of the House of Representatives, who would then appoint six eminent citizens to serve with them. These should be persons of the highest professional and technical capacity, some scientifically trained in matters relevant to defense, and others who are experienced in international affairs. The Commission would include no more than a single member of any one standing committee of either the House or the Senate. A representative of the Comptroller General would be the 17th member so that his fiscal knowledge would be available to the Commission.

The Temporary National Security Commission would cease to exist at the end of the 92d Congress and make its final report before January 1, 1973.

It is expected that the Commission members must necessarily be privy to some classified material and intelligence, and the bill cautions that on sensitive matters of national security the Commission shall heed the counsel of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Commission would be expected to make a widespread study of defense and security areas. The bill does not stipulate exactly which agencies and departments are to be encompassed, for it is wise not to handicap any investigation by prior judgment which would limit its scope. However, the bill does specifically require a study of those agencies and departments established in the National Security Act of 1947. These include the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the one-time National Security Resources Board, predecessor of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. Likewise, all components of the National Military Establishment provided in the 1947 act would be included.

The Commission would study the foregoing agencies and their activities with a view to determining—

First, what are the current national policies and objectives in the area of defense and security and, in view of such policies and objectives, whether the national interest is being properly served by the existing agencies of Government;

Second, whether existing and projected weapons systems, military installations, management procedures, and fiscal performance of such agencies conform to national policy in the area of defense;

Third, to what extent the defense establishment as an institution affects individual judgment in the making and execution of policy; and

Fourth, whether the relationships between agencies of the Federal Government responsible for procurement and suppliers of goods and services require modification.

The Commission would be required to make recommendations—including suggested legislation—to the Congress particularly with regard to the improvement of policy for national security and the effectiveness of procedures and organization in those agencies of the Federal Government which function in the area of defense.

In sum, it is our thought that no aspect of defense or national security should be overlooked.

The concept of such a temporary Commission of investigation springs from the celebrated Temporary National Economic Committee set up in 1938 under Senator O'Mahoney, which conducted a study into the concentration of economic power. The extensive reports that resulted from that investigation are still admired.

The findings of the temporary Committee of 1938-41 gave impetus to the antitrust prosecutions of that period. They generated the atmosphere for judicial decisions which achieved reforms in such areas as resale price maintenance, the basing-point system of pricing

and the patent system. The Committee studies the process of corporate mergers which were dealt with in later legislation such as the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.

We have not overlooked the fact that the President on June 30 announced the establishment of a blue-ribbon panel to conduct a year's study of the Department of Defense. It is significant that the President perceived the need for such a study, and it should be useful to him. However, it is our considered view that Congress must be involved in any review of the Department of Defense. Congress has a constitutional duty in this area. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to exercise to the fullest extent its responsibility—a failure which has contributed to the present crisis.

The Temporary National Security Commission would be in a position to conduct a more objective and detached analysis than the President's blue-ribbon panel which is responsible directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Furthermore, our proposed commission would have a more extensive mandate than the President's panel which would survey only the Department of Defense and would concentrate on such activities as organization and management, research and procurement policies and practices.

The Temporary National Security Commission would serve a broader purpose, for it would examine defense policy in relation to foreign policy objectives, military performance, and the capability and relevance of weapons systems to their purpose. All aspects of national security would be scrutinized.

Certainly Congress not only has the right to know, but it must be fully informed in the areas of national security and defense policy. This is basic. The proposed Temporary National Security Commission is a minimal instrumentality to assist Congress in this vital area of national concern.

The following is a list of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who have joined in sponsoring the bill to create a Temporary Commission on National Security:

LIST OF SPONSORS

SENATE SPONSORS

George McGovern (S. Dak.).  
Walter Mondale (Minn.).  
Gaylord Nelson (Wis.).  
William B. Saxbe (Ohio).

HOUSE SPONSORS

William F. Ryan (N.Y.).  
George Brown, Jr. (Calif.).  
Phillip Burton (Calif.).  
Shirley Chisholm (N.Y.).  
William L. Clay (Mo.).  
John Conyers, Jr. (Mich.).  
Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Mich.).  
Bob Eckhardt (Tex.).  
Don Edwards (Calif.).  
Donald M. Fraser (Minn.).  
Jacob H. Gilbert (N.Y.).  
William J. Green (Pa.).  
Augustus Hawkins (Calif.).  
Henry Helstoski (N.J.).  
Robert W. Kastenmeier (Wis.).  
Edward I. Koch (N.Y.).  
Robert L. Leggett (Calif.).  
Allard K. Lowenstein (N.Y.).  
Abner J. Mikva (Ill.).  
Patsy T. Mink (Hawaii).

William S. Moorhead (Pa.).  
Richard L. Ottinger (N.Y.).  
Bertram L. Podell (N.Y.).  
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (N.Y.).  
James H. Scheuer (N.Y.).  
Louis Stokes (Ohio).  
Robert O. Tiernan (R.I.).  
Lester L. Wolff (N.Y.).

Mr. Speaker, I include at this point in the Record the text of the bill to establish a Temporary National Security Commission:

H.R. 14323

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that the immense demands upon our national resources for purposes of defense and security have become a matter of deep concern in our society and that there is evidence that institutional momentum, rather than conscious policy, governs decisions relating to defense and national security. The Congress also finds that there is increasing criticism being made of the Federal agencies responsible for national defense and security with respect to their choices of weapons systems and procurement policies and practices. The Congress further finds that the rising costs of the military and the changing international situation, as well as the factors previously mentioned, require that a complete study and review of the national defense sector be immediately undertaken as a first step toward the solution of these problems.

ESTABLISHMENT

SEC. 2. There is established a commission to be known as the Temporary National Security Commission (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Commission").

DUTIES OF COMMISSION

SEC. 3. It shall be the duty of the Commission—

(1) to make a full and complete study and investigation of all activities with respect to national security and defense, including, but not limited to, the operation of all agencies established in the National Security Act of 1947, and any legislation subsequent thereto providing for the coordination for national security or constituting the national Military Establishment, with a view to determining—

(A) what are the current national policies and objectives in the area of defense and security and, in view of such policies and objectives, whether the national interest is being properly served by the existing agencies of Government;

(B) whether existing and projected weapons systems, military installations, management procedures and fiscal performance of such agencies conform to national policy in the area of defense;

(C) to what extent the defense establishment as an institution affects individual judgment in the making and execution of policy; and

(D) whether the relationships between agencies of the Federal Government responsible for procurement and suppliers of goods and services require modification; and

(2) to make recommendations (including suggested legislation) to the Congress with respect to subjects covered in paragraph (1) particularly with regard to the improvement of policy for national security and the effectiveness of procedures and organization in those agencies of the Federal Government which function in the area of defense.

MEMBERSHIP

SEC. 4. (a) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.—The Commission shall be composed of 17 members as follows:

(1) Five Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker

of the House of Representatives, three from the majority party and two from the minority party.

(2) Five Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, three from the majority party and two from the minority party.

(3) Six individuals from private life to be appointed, with due regard given to insuring a balance of political viewpoint, by the members of Congress appointed under paragraph (1) and (2).

(4) One representative of the General Accounting Office to be appointed by the Comptroller General of the United States.

A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect the power of the remaining Members to execute the functions of the Commission and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. At no time may any one standing committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives be represented by more than one individual chosen pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2). Individuals from private life appointed under paragraph (3) shall be appointed for the life of the Commission and shall be of acknowledged eminence in fields of study or activity of national importance.

(b) COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), Members of the Commission shall each be entitled to receive \$150 for each day (including travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(2) A Member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1), (2), or (4) of the subsection (a) shall receive no additional compensation on account of his service on the Commission.

(3) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, Members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as the expenses authorized by section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

(c) QUORUM.—Nine Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, and actions by the Commission shall be determined by a majority vote of the Members present.

(d) CHAIRMAN.—The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Commission shall be elected by the Members of the Commission from among those Members appointed under paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (a).

(e) MEETINGS.—The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman or a majority of its Members.

(f) Any Member of the Commission may, if unable to attend a meeting of the Commission, authorize another Member to act and vote for him in his absence.

STAFF OF COMMISSION

SEC. 5. (a) STAFF.—The Commission may appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable.

(b) APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL SERVICE LAWS.—The staff of the Commission may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(c) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.—The Commission shall establish such security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as it deems necessary in the interest of national security. The Commission may arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of such security or other personnel investigations of the Commission's employees, consultants, and contractors, actual or prospective, as it deems appropriate. If any such investigation develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the sub-

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ject thereof is of questionable loyalty, the matter shall be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Commission.

#### POWERS OF COMMISSION

Sec. 6. (a) **HEARINGS AND SESSIONS.**—The Commission may for the purpose of carrying out this Act hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission may deem advisable. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it.

#### (b) SUBPENA POWER.

(1) The Commission shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter which the Commission is empowered to investigate by section 3. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States at any designated place of hearing within the United States.

(2) If a person issued a subpoena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey such subpoena or is guilty of contempt, any court of the United States within the judicial district within which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial district within which such person is found or resides or transacts business may (upon application by the Commission) order such person to appear before the Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

(3) The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a District Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts.

(4) All process of any court to which application may be made under this section may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(c) **IMMUNITY.**—No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(d) **POWERS OF MEMBERS, SUBCOMMITTEES AND AGENTS.**—When so authorized by the Commission, any Member, subcommittee, or agent of the Commission may take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section.

(e) **OBTAINING OFFICIAL DATA.**—The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Commission such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission. During the course of its investigations and deliberations, and in making its reports, findings, and recommendations, the Commission shall exercise due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "classified information" means information which is, for reasons of national security, specifically des-

igned by a department or agency of the United States for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.

(f) The Commission is authorized to enter into contracts with qualified educational institutions, other public or private organizations or agencies, or individuals for the preparation of studies related to the Commission's duties, except that any contract entered into under this subsection shall require that the services contracted for be completed before January 1, 1973.

#### AUTHORIZATION

Sec. 7. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

#### REPORTS

Sec. 8. Before January 1, 1971, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, the Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress preliminary reports of the studies and investigations carried on by it, together with its findings and recommendations, and shall transmit to the President and to the Congress before January 1, 1973, the final reports on the studies and investigations carried out by it pursuant to this Act, together with its final recommendations transmitted by it pursuant to this section at the time of such transmittal, except that the Commission shall withhold from the text of reports and recommendations made available to the public or transmitted to the Congress any part thereof the release of which, in the Commission's judgment, would be detrimental to national security.

#### TERMINATION

Sec. 9. The Commission shall cease to exist on December 31, 1972.

### OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW PROPOSED

The **SPEAKER** pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing for myself and 27 of my colleagues in the House a bill to establish an Office of Defense Review. A similar bill is being introduced in the other body. The bill is designed to meet a need which House Members of both parties have been feeling increasingly since the beginning of this year, and which was demonstrated most vividly 2 weeks ago when we considered the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1970. That need is for a source of independent, technically qualified evaluation of Defense Department programs, planning and weapons systems as represented in the DOD requests presented to the Congress. It is our hope that a statutorily authorized Office of Defense Review will adequately meet that need.

#### PURPOSE OF OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW

The Office of Defense Review, as contemplated in the bill we are introducing today, would be an agency of the legislative branch of Government, reporting directly to a joint congressional board, the Joint Board of Defense Review. It is envisioned as a permanent part of the congressional machinery, with permanent responsibility for evaluating for Congress the defense proposals of the Pentagon. Its responsibilities would not overlap those of the Armed Services Committees of each House, since its work would be more basic—a combination of the Bureau of the Budget in the execu-

tive branch and the General Accounting Office which now functions as the permanent investigating arm of Congress. The ODR would have specific responsibility for preparing for Congress alternative defense budget proposals, based on a range of planning assumptions about United States foreign policy and military posture. It would provide a range of choices from which Congress could select, rather than the present take-it-or-leave-it approach.

#### PROVIDE INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

One of the most important functions of the Office of Defense Review would be to furnish to interested Members of Congress a detached, objective evaluation of weapons systems proposals advanced by the Department of Defense. In this respect, it would serve as a kind of augmented legislative reference service, concentrating specifically on legislative proposals relating to the national security community and national defense policy. Hopefully, the ODR would be able to furnish to Congressmen who are not members of the Armed Services Committee enough information on Pentagon proposals—and enough in advance of the consideration of those proposals—to make intelligent evaluation and debate possible. The staff of the Office of Defense Review would be trained in much the same techniques as employees of the Pentagon's Systems Analysis Office, and would be cleared to deal with material of the highest security classification. The ODR would work not for any one Member of the House or for any one committee, but would make its services available to any Member who desired to use them.

#### SCOPE OF INQUIRY AND CONCERN

It is proposed that the scope of the ODR's inquiries and investigations would be limited not merely to evaluating the finished product of the Pentagon—its budgetary and weapons systems proposals—but would include more fundamental concerns such as strategic planning, the validity of planning assumptions, the relations of military planning assumptions to overall U.S. foreign policy goals, and the contribution of individual weapons systems to U.S. national security. These are the kinds of fundamental questions which, all too often, no individual Congressman and no committee has had the time to ask. These are the kinds of unexamined assumptions which have led to the tremendous overemphasis on defense spending at the expense of both other elements of foreign policy and our domestic social and economic programs. One of the purposes of the ODR would be to help correct this imbalance in our national priorities.

#### JOINT BOARD OF DEFENSE REVIEW

The Office of Defense Review would not be left to operate on its own and wage its own battles with the behemoth of the executive branch. It would receive both support and guidance from a joint Board composed of three Members from each House of Congress. The members of the Board would select their own Chairman and Vice Chairman, and both parties would be required to be represented among the Members from each House. One of the continuing functions



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Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500040001-8

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of the Board would be the supervision of the operations of the Office of Defense Review. Presumably it would also make known to the Congress the need for any necessary changes in the ODR's statutory charter.

#### GENESIS OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW

The idea of creating an Office of Defense Review originated in the conference on the military budget and national priorities which was held in March and was attended by Members of the House and Senate. At that conference it became clear that the responsibilities of Members of Congress and of the existing Armed Services Committees precluded the in-depth, comprehensive review of the assumptions behind national defense programs which was a direct constitutional responsibility of the Congress. Because of the lack of searching, comprehensive investigation, many programs were being carried out which either did not serve the purposes of U.S. foreign policy or which were so expensive and contributed so little to our security that their cost was not justified. The once-a-year look which Congress was able to give these programs simply was not sufficient, it was concluded, to provide the necessary check on defense activities.

#### THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The real arm of the Office of Defense Review is the development of a cadre of technically qualified, career civil servants who will help the Congress evaluate defense policies and programs in terms of their overall contribution to the Nation. The ODR would not become an advocate for defense programs. Rather it would act as the Congress representative in scrutinizing and evaluating these programs in terms of their real contribution to national security. As a permanent established arm of Congress, the ODR could give a continuity and expertise to this function which is not now possible. Most important, it would provide Members of Congress with the kind of objective information which they need if they are to weigh intelligently the requirements of national security against the pressing needs here at home. By providing this information in the form of alternative budget proposals, the ODR would enable Congress to pick and choose among programs and policies, and would enable it to balance the requirements of defense spending against the priorities of education, health, environmental quality, and general welfare.

We believe that the establishment of an Office of Defense Review could bring back into focus the true purposes of this Union. We formed this alliance of States, which has long since become one Nation, not only to provide for the common defense. Equally important in the eyes of the Founders were the responsibilities to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." The Office of Defense Review can help to give us the perspective and objectivity which we need to balance the demands of national defense against those other pressing national purposes.

A copy of our bill follows:

H.R. —

A bill to create an Office of Defense Review  
*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. The Congress finds that expenditures for military purposes are ever mounting and constitute a large fraction of total government outlays and, therefore, that it is greatly in the national interest that provisions for defense and national security be subject to continuous Congressional review to insure, for example, that arm's length relations prevail between defense procurement agencies and suppliers of goods and services, that defense procurement costs be properly estimated in advance of commitments and reported currently, and that the performance of weapons systems and the merit of military installations be evaluated before and after procurement in order that there can be a determination as to whether they serve national policy in the area of defense and national security. To effectuate such a review, the Congress needs the assistance of an office with a continuing mission to provide reports giving independent evaluations of defense and national security matters. Such an agency could also significantly aid the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and of the House of Representatives in meeting their immense responsibilities with respect to evaluation and oversight in the area of defense.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE REVIEW

Sec. 2. (a) There shall be created an establishment of the Government to be known as the Office of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Office"), which shall be independent of the executive departments and under the control and direction of the Director of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Director"). The Director is authorized to adopt a seal for the Office.

(b) There shall be in the Office the Director and an Assistant Director of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Assistant Director"), each of whom shall be nominated by the President from a slate of candidates submitted to him under section 5(d)(4) of this Act by the Joint Board of Defense Review, and appointed by him with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Director shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the Director, and during the absence or incapacity of the Director, or during a vacancy in that office, shall act as the Director.

(c) The annual compensation of the Director shall be equal to the annual compensation of the Comptroller General of the United States. The annual compensation of the Assistant Director shall be equal to that of the Assistant Comptroller General of the United States.

(d) The Director and the Assistant Director shall be an "employee" within the meaning of such term as used in section 8331(1) of title 5, United States Code, and service performed by them shall be creditable service for all purposes of subchapter III (relating to civil service retirement) of chapter 83 of such title.

(e) The term of office of the Director and the Assistant Director shall be four years and, unless removed under subsection (f), an individual appointed to such office is not ineligible for selection under section 5(d)(4) of this Act.

(f) The Director or Assistant Director may be removed at any time by joint resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when, in the judgment of Congress, the Director or Assistant Director has become permanently

incapacitated or has been inefficient, or guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment.

#### FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE

SEC. 3. It shall be the function of the Office, under the direction of the Director—

(1) to determine whether projected weapons systems and military installations accord with national policy in the area of defense;

(2) to determine whether the actual performance of procured weapons systems and installations in the area of defense is in accord with originally declared objectives and national policy in the area of defense and national security;

(3) to prepare for the Congress a defense budget for each fiscal year which shall be independent of that prepared by the executive branch and shall be available in the course of the appropriations process in Congress, for comparison with the executive defense budget;

(4) to prepare optional defense budgets based on alternative assumptions concerning policy and weapons systems for defense and national security;

(5) to report to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to other appropriate Congressional committees, and to the Joint Board of Defense Review on all of the matters listed in paragraphs (1) through (4), together with (A) recommendations for conduct of national defense and security, and (B) one summary annual report to be submitted in advance of the submittal to the Congress of the annual budget of the executive branch;

(6) to provide information to individual Members of Congress, upon request, concerning matters of defense and national security; and

(7) to recommend to the Joint Board of Defense Review improvements in the operating efficiency of executive departments of the Government in the area of defense and national security.

#### POWERS OF THE OFFICE

Sec. 4. (a) In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Office is authorized—

(1) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of the operations of the Agency;

(2) subject to the civil service and classification laws, to select, appoint, employ and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and to prescribe their authority and duties;

(3) to use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of Federal and other agencies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment and facilities; and

(4) to establish such security requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as it deems necessary in the interest of national security, exercising due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, and

(A) to arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of such security or other personnel investigations of the Office's employees and contractors, actual or prospective, as it deems appropriate, and

(B) if any investigation under paragraph (A) develops any data reflecting that the individual who is the subject thereof is of questionable loyalty, to refer the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Office.

(b) Upon the request of the Director—

Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000500040001-8

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(1) the head of any department or agency in the executive branch shall furnish to the Director copies of any report submitted by such department or agency to the Comptroller General of the United States if the Director deems such report to be of consequence in the area of defense and national security, and

(2) the Comptroller General of the United States shall furnish to the Director copies of analyses of expenditures prepared by the General Accounting Office with respect to any department or agency in the executive branch if the Defense Review Director deems such analyses to be of consequence in the area of defense and national security.

(c) (1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the Director reports of all exceptions taken by the Comptroller General to the financial or other activities of any department or agency in the executive branch in the area of defense and national security, and also reports of any settlements or conclusions reached by the Comptroller General with respect to such exceptions.

(2) The Comptroller General shall transmit to the Director copies of all reports prepared by the Comptroller General pursuant to section 283 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 103).

#### JOINT BOARD OF DEFENSE REVIEW

SEC. 5. (a) There is hereby established a Joint Board of Defense Review (hereafter referred to in this section as the "Board") to be composed of three Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and three Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In the case of the Members appointed from each House of the Congress, the majority party shall be represented by two Members and the minority party represented by one Member.

(b) Members of the Board shall serve for terms of no longer than a total of five sessions of Congress. The Board shall select a chairman and vice chairman from among its members. Members of the Board shall receive no additional compensation on account of their service on the Board but shall be reimbursed for travel and other expenses incurred while performing work as Members of the Board.

(c) A member of the Board may, when unable to attend a meeting of the Board, authorize another such member to act for him in his absence. A vacancy in the Board shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the Board, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original selection. Four members shall constitute a quorum of the Board. Decisions of the Board shall be taken by majority vote and a tie vote shall be decided according to the vote of the chairman, or, in his absence, the vice chairman.

(d) It shall be the function of the Board—

- (1) to receive reports from the Director relating to his activities,

- (2) to aid the Director in the interpretation of national defense policy,

- (3) otherwise to counsel and advise the Director in the performance of his duties, and

- (4) in the event of a vacancy in the office of Director or Assistant Director, to submit to the President the names of five individuals who, in the judgment of the Board, are qualified to hold such office.

#### JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a joint resolution to create a Joint Committee on National Priorities. This resolution recognizes the intense conflicts caused by competing demands for the country's limited tax resources, and seeks a more intelligent rationalization of these conflicts by Congress.

The resolution authorizes the joint committee to suggest national objectives and the allocation of resources needed to obtain those objectives; and to suggest legislation and other governmental actions needed to better serve the Nation's priorities.

The need for such a joint committee arises from the fact that we do not have enough tax dollars to do all that we want our Government to do. Our present deficiencies in such vital areas as health, education, and transportation make clear that we cannot fight a war in Vietnam, be profligate in military hardware build every dam that can be dreamed up, and still provide the social progress demanded of a rich and civilized Nation. The people will not stand for higher taxes, and they should not have to. The tax dollar is now a poor investment for the American taxpayer. It is our task to make it a good investment.

A Joint Committee on National Priorities would help to correct the often unintended displacement of values and national demands that now plagues our government. We are now faced with such spectacles as the Executive's simultaneously cutting back research on cancer and children's diseases and spending millions for a "main battle tank" that is obsolete even if it can be made to work. Development continues on a fantastically expensive supersonic transport which will reduce the flying time from New York to Paris by a few hours; but we have not even begun to solve the problem of efficiently transporting Americans to their daily jobs. Congress appropriates tens of millions of dollars for chemical and biological weapons, but is niggardly in its funding of food programs for the hungry.

Such distortions of our national values result in large measure from our fragmented approach to governmental policies, and in particular to governmental spending. Many programs continue to be funded simply because they exist. Virtually every area of governmental spending has its constituency of bureaucrats and special interest groups.

When we do respond to a critical need, we do so by drafting new promises and new programs, not by considering a reallocation of resources. The result is illustrated by the fate of the Clean Water Restoration Act. That act recognized the crisis presented by the pollution of our Nation's lakes and rivers by municipal wastes, and sought to provide our cities with \$1 billion per year to deal with this crisis while there was still time. Congress has since found that it is very difficult to appropriate that \$1 billion without cutting back other programs of less value to the country. Rather than considering the place of clean water in our national priorities and acting accordingly, we have simply failed to come

through with the money authorized by the Clean Water Restoration Act.

Establishment of a Joint Committee on National Priorities would help us make the hard decisions that are needed if we are to act according to the urgency of our needs rather than according to which needs have been around the longest or pushed the strongest. The joint committee would give us the benefit of an informed overview of national needs and national resources. It would be a valuable first step in more intelligently matching our needs and our resources.

The text of the joint resolution follows:

H.J. RES. 949

Joint resolution to create a joint congressional committee to review, and recommend changes in, national priorities and resource allocation

Whereas national objectives, to the extent that they are affected by action of the Federal Government, ought to be more clearly formulated; and

Whereas national objectives can be realized only if all competing demands for priority in the allocation of resources disposed of by the Federal Government can be reconciled on a continuing basis; and

Whereas the immense demands upon national resources for purposes of defense and national security have become a matter of deep concern in our society; and

Whereas the Congress can meet its constitutional obligation as a coordinate branch of the Government more fully if it will consider the overall relationship of the many separate legislative demands: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That there is hereby created a joint congressional committee to be known as the Joint Committee on National Priorities (hereafter referred to in this joint resolution as the "joint committee") to be composed of seven Members of the Senate to be designated by the President of the Senate and seven Members of the House of Representatives to be designated by the Speaker. Of the seven Members appointed from each house of the Congress, the majority party shall be represented by four members and the minority party shall be represented by three members. No one standing committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives may be represented by more than one Member on the joint committee at any time.

SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized—

- (1) to suggest national objectives and, on a current and continuing basis, to examine these objectives as they are affected by actions of the Federal Government;

- (2) in the light of the examinations undertaken in paragraph (1), to suggest national priorities and to recommend, on a continuing basis, the allocation of resources disposed of by the Federal Government to such national priorities;

- (3) to obtain from the departments and agencies in the executive branch annual posture statements on the operations and objectives of the departments and agencies as they relate to such national priorities and to assess such statements;

- (4) to suggest legislation that will contribute to the attainment of national objectives; and

- (5) to recommend courses of action, based on its findings and investigations, in the national interest to departments and agencies in the executive branch, to the States and political subdivisions thereof, and to regional agencies.

(b) The joint committee shall, before the close of each calendar year, submit to the Congress a posture statement on national priorities, which shall include a proposed Federal budget of income and expenditures covering a period of not less than the five consecutive fiscal years next succeeding the calendar year in which the posture statement is submitted.

SEC. 3. (a) A vacancy in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the powers of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members; except that no member may serve as chairman or vice chairman for longer than one Congress.

(b) An individual is not eligible to be a member of the joint committee after such individual has served as such a member for a total of eight sessions of Congress. For the purpose of the preceding sentence, service on the joint committee for a full session of Congress or part of a session shall count as one session of service.

SEC. 4. In addition to the reports required under section 2, the members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House of Representatives on the results of the joint committee's studies and investigations, together with their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

SEC. 5. In carrying out its duties, the joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings or investigations, to sit and act at such places and times, to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The joint committee may make such rules respecting its organization and procedures as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of the chairman of the joint committee or by any member designated by him or by the joint committee, and may be served by such person or persons as may be designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. The provisions of section 192 and 194 of title 2, United States Code, shall apply in case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section. The cost of stenographic service to report public hearings shall not be in excess of the amounts prescribed by law for reporting the hearings of standing committees of the Senate. The cost of stenographic service to report executive hearings shall be fixed at an equitable rate by the joint committee. Members of the joint committee, and its employees and consultants, while traveling on official business for the joint committee, may receive either the per diem allowance authorized to be paid to Members of Congress or its employees, or their actual and necessary expenses provided an itemized statement of such expenses is attached to the voucher.

SEC. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, technicians, and staff employees as it deems necessary and advisable. The joint committee is authorized (1) to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government and (2) to contract with educational institutions, public or private agencies or organizations, or in-

dividuals for the conduct of research or studies with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

SEC. 7. The joint committee shall establish such security requirements, restrictions and safeguards over its records as it deems necessary in the interest of national security, exercising due care to protect classified information, sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and, in this regard, shall seek the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence. All committee records, data, charts, and files shall be the property of the joint committee and shall be kept in the offices of the joint committee or other places as the joint committee may direct under such security safeguards as the joint committee shall determine in the interest of the common defense and security.

SEC. 8. The expenses of the joint committee shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman of the joint committee or by any member of the joint committee duly authorized by the chairman.

### REPORT ON NATO TOUR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, recently I was privileged to represent the United States on the biennial military tour of the NATO Assembly. For a period of 10 days I inspected NATO military installations in the company of legislators and members of parliament from several NATO countries. I found the experience to be worthwhile and most interesting. I returned with definite ideas and conclusions regarding our NATO defenses which I have reported to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS.

Because my conclusions are that we should drastically reduce our commitment of men and materiel in the defense of Europe, and in light of the current national debate regarding our military posture, I thought the substance of my report would be of interest and thought provoking to all Members of Congress. The report follows:

The Military Committee of the NATO Assembly (formerly NATO Parliamentarians) conducts a biennial tour of Allied military installations in Europe. On alternate years the tour is conducted in the United States. Its purpose is to formulate reports and recommendations for consideration of the North Atlantic Assembly. This group, an unofficial body with no statutory powers, provides an important platform for discussions between parliamentary delegates from all NATO countries. It also serves to improve liaison between the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations and the legislative bodies of NATO countries.

#### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.A.—Congressmen Paul Findley and Charles S. Gubser.

Germany—Dr. Herman Kopf and Mr. Josef Felder of the West German Bundestag.

Belgium—Mr. Paul De Vlies, Mr. Andre Bricot, and Mr. Wim. P. Geldolf.

Canada—Senator Alexander Hamilton McDonald and M.P.s Alastair W. Gillespie, Patrick Mahoney, and Howard R. MacEwan.

Denmark—M.P.s Adam Moeller and Kjeld Olesen.

France—Senator Auguste Billlemaz.

Italy—Senator Giuseppe Vedovato and Deputy Luigi M. Galli.

Luxembourg—Deputy Romain Fandel.

Norway—Storting Members Finn Moe and Lelf Kolflaath.

Netherlands—C. E. P. M. Raedts and F. J. Goedhart, members, Chamber of States-General.

United Kingdom—Mr. John Peel, M.P.

Turkey—Senator Sirri Atalay and Deputy Nurettin Ok.

#### ITINERARY

The tour assembled at Brussels on September 1 and visited Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in the afternoon, conducting a discussion with the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

On September 2 we were briefed at Headquarters for Allied Forces Central Europe in Brunssum. In the afternoon we visited the NADGE programming and training center at Glons.

On September 3 we were in Frankfurt at Rhine-Main Air Base and next went to Mannheim-Seckenheim for a briefing by the Central Army Group and U.S. Army Europe.

On the morning of September 4 I briefly left the tour to witness a firing of the Sheridan-Shillelagh weapons system at Grafenwoehr tank range. I rejoined the group for a briefing by the Central Army Group and another program sponsored by U.S. Army Europe.

September 5 found us at Munich for a continuation of the Central Army Group and U.S. Army Europe program at Oberammergau and a briefing at the school conducted by these groups in that area.

After a free day on September 6, we spent time at Lahr with the First Canadian Air Division on September 7. The rest of the day was spent en route to Muenster, Germany.

On September 8 we were at Bergen-Nohne to witness a brigade-size firing demonstration which began a large exercise conducted by the German Army called "Grosser Roesselsprung".

On September 9 we were at Bergen, Norway, at Headquarters for Allied Forces Northern Europe. After a briefing and tour of the Haakomsvern Naval Base, we departed Bergen for Northolt RAF Station near London.

On September 10 we visited the Headquarters of the Western Fleet and were briefed by the Commander of the Channel Command. Following this day, I departed the tour.

#### FINDINGS

The concentrated exposure to NATO military problems for a period in excess of one week and extended discussions with military personnel of all participating nations presented an excellent perspective of the threat facing NATO forces and the requirements for meeting that threat. However, the great benefit was more political than military. Constant close association with legislators from other NATO countries gave each participant a "feel" for the political problems which will inevitably have their effect upon military policy.

It is my considered view that the threat to Free Europe from the Soviet Union has not diminished to any extent. Quite to the contrary, I believe the recent Czechoslovakian incident has underscored the determination of the Soviet Union to maintain a high and superior level of military force which can be directed against Europe. I personally believe that Russia has superior air power, armor, and a superiority in numbers of trained troops. In the event of invasion by Communist forces, Russia would possess the advantage of picking an invasion route and timing the aggression to achieve maximum surprise and inconvenience to Allied defenders. This means that the defenders must be prepared to defend against any one of several possible invasion plans. To thoroughly prepare for all eventualities would be expensive and difficult.

While I do not consider myself sufficiently competent to draw a firm military conclusion, I cannot admit to holding much con-

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fidence that present NATO forces can stand up against a determined Russian aggression.

The military organization of SHAPE is excellent. Obviously it is manned by competent officers who have developed workable plans, but what concerns me is what appears to be a serious deficiency in military materiel, equipment, and personnel required to implement those plans. When France was an active military partner of NATO, we at least had geographic depth, but today we have neither geography nor the men and equipment with which to offer a conventional response to a Soviet invasion.

One hears a great deal of the new theory called "flexible response" which has been developed as a reassuring symbol of our ability to defend Europe without France as a full-fledged NATO military partner. In theory, "flexible response" would commit conventional forces and weaponry in the degree required to meet the threat against us. This is a fine theory, but it is worthless without the men and materiel to back it up. NATO has neither.

Under such circumstances, the alternatives which NATO commanders and leaders of NATO nations would have in the event of aggression are limited to the extremes. Since I have no confidence that the present degree of conventional commitment by NATO nations could hold against a determined aggression, the alternatives would be (1) accept the fact that Russia can overrun Europe, or (2) resort immediately to the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the grave risk of escalating an invasion of Europe into a general war.

It is obvious that if the words "flexible response" are to be more than a cliché or an idle phrase and if the alternatives are to be broadened to include more than the extremes, a much greater commitment to NATO must be made by all nations and particularly by the European nations whose countries will be at stake.

While this latter problem was not directly discussed with NATO parliamentarians, it was clear to me that most of them felt that even their present commitment to NATO was either beyond what they could afford or what the present day political climate would allow them to commit. Learning this fact has led me to the conclusions and recommendations which appear below:

#### CONCLUSION

Unless European nations and other members of the NATO alliance are willing to make commitments of men, materiel, and money to the extent necessary to make "flexible response" more than a myth, the tremendous U.S. presence and expense to the taxpayer is a waste. Frankly, for political reasons, I foresee no possibility of this happening in the immediate future.

To be sure, the United States must "show the flag" in Europe, but this can be done with an Air Force wing and far less than a division of troops. Materiel can be stored and the pipe line kept open which would allow troops to be quickly airlifted if needed. The bulk of our force in Europe should be brought home, resulting in a considerable saving to the U.S. taxpayer.

While other countries withdraw, the United States, which is already overcommitted, cannot be expected to fill the vacuum they leave. The time has come for a complete re-assessment of our NATO military policy. We must stop "whistling in the dark". We do not have an adequate defense, we will not get it until other NATO nations assume a just share of their responsibility and, without it, we are wasting our money.

I strongly recommend that a complete re-assessment of our policy in Europe be undertaken at the highest possible Congressional and Executive Branch levels.

#### COLUMBUS DAY, 1969

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. RODINO) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, this year marked a very special commemoration of October 12, Columbus Day, the anniversary of the great Genoese navigator's landfall in our New World.

For in this year men first landed on the moon, and this has been compared with Columbus' discovery of America. In fact, in honor of the great explorer, our American astronauts—Neil Armstrong, Edwin "Buz" Aldrin and Michael Collins—named their command ship "Columbia" in tribute to the admiral of the ocean seas.

At the time when our astronauts first set foot on the moon, the dean of American historians and definitive biographer of Christopher Columbus, Adm. Samuel Eliot Morison, commented on the validity of the comparison. He stated:

I think there is validity in the fact that as Columbus' voyage was a tremendous breakthrough in modern history, the astronauts' voyage to the moon may well prove to be a breakthrough in our history with similar and beautiful results. But of course the technique of the two voyages was so very different, you can hardly compare the two.

Obviously, Mr. Speaker, one of the key differences is incomparably greater scientific and technological resources of the 20th century. If the scientists of Columbus' time had had their way, he might never have made his voyage. For, as Admiral Morison stated:

He appeared before three different scientific commissions in Portugal and Spain and they all said he couldn't do it—and the amusing thing is they were right. He was aiming at the eastern coast of China and they all said it was twice as far as he thought it was and he could never get there and back in a sailing ship. Columbus went ahead just the same, but America happened to be where he thought China was.

It is interesting to note that the space effort that made our moon voyage possible cost the United States some \$25,000 million. And contrary to popular belief, Columbus' voyage was by any standard inexpensive. It is only a popular legend that Queen Isabella of Spain had to pawn her crown jewels to raise money for Columbus. As Admiral Morison explained:

I once made a careful computation of what Columbus' first voyage cost—it was fourteen thousand dollars in gold to outfit the fleet or at least two ships of the fleet. The cost of the other one was picked up by some of Columbus' friends and their monthly payroll was sixteen hundred dollars in gold for thirty-two months. You see, that is probably what the astronaut project cost in about five minutes.

Admiral Morison also contrasted the role of the astronauts and Columbus as individuals. And in spite of the necessity for collective effort and scientific precision on the part of thousands in space exploration, he stressed his firm conviction that individuality and initiative are as important today as they were in Columbus' time.

The admiral stated:

It was Columbus who had the big idea. The astronauts didn't have the idea; they were spearheads. Nonetheless they are to be honored for their courage. I think all three young men are essentially rugged individualists. There are millions more in our country. There is an enormous future for the rugged individualist in this country and all over the world.

During Columbus' time, Admiral Morison noted, there was a gloomy religious atmosphere that pervaded the 15th century because of the imminent expectation of the day of judgment and the horrors that were to accompany it. He compared it to the general feeling of pessimism in our own time.

So the historic voyage of Columbus was a unique and a shining beacon during those difficult years. And Admiral Morison's conclusion has significant implications for us today:

Columbus had really opened up something, a breakthrough that counted—that meant that Europe was not going downhill to eventual destruction, but that there was something fresh coming up. So I hope we will feel about the astronauts and their visit to the moon. Something new and fresh and extraordinary is coming up. We are not going to allow the atomic bomb to wipe us out. I hope, pray and believe that civilization in our day will be greatly affected for the good by the astronauts' work just as civilization in the fifteen hundreds was affected by Columbus' discovery.

Mr. Speaker, I had the great privilege at our celebration of Columbus Day in Newark yesterday to participate in the parade and festivities and I was particularly pleased that Capt. Robert Marasco, the courageous Green Beret officer from Bloomfield, was able to attend the ceremonies and was honored by receiving the key to the city. I include two articles from the Star-Ledger and the Evening News of October 13, 1969, which describe the occasion, in the Record following my remarks:

[From the Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger, Oct. 13, 1969]

GIVEN KEY TO CITY—COLUMBUS CHEER FOR BEET

(By Barbara Kukla)

The Mets took second place in the hearts of thousands of Essex County residents who lined Newark's Broad Street yesterday for the 61st annual Columbus Day parade.

With the temperature a summerlike 79, the throngs withstood the humidity for activities which began with a wreath-laying ceremony at Washington Park before the march down the main thoroughfare.

Probably the biggest ovation of the day was for Green Beret Capt. Robert Marasco of Bloomfield, who was presented with the Key to the City.

#### GREAT HONOR

Accompanied by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, who helped to engineer his release after the alleged killing of a Vietnamese espionage agent, Marasco looked rested and happy, posing for dozens of pictures and signing autographs.

"It's a great honor to be presented the Key to the City," Marasco told the audience in front of City Hall. "I never expected it. In fact, I didn't expect to be asked to speak."

He then thanked the American people, "and especially Congressman Rodino," for the support given him.